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I. INTRODUCTION
In The Federalist, James Madison extolled the virtues of
representative government and decried the dangers of mobocracy
and factionalism inherent in popular democracy.' In the November
1978 general election, however, over 200 measures of initiative
and referendum appeared on the ballot in thirty-eight states.2
That experience is representative of a national trend towards in-
creasing direct participation in lawmaking.' As direct legislative
methods increase in popularity, the fears expressed by Madison at
the nation's inception take on renewed currency in the minds of
many.
This Note examines possible constitutional constraints on initi-
ative and referendum. Part II briefly discusses typical initiative and
referendum procedures and contrasts these with representative leg-
islative processes. Part III examines the constitutional significance
of the differences highlighted in Part II. Finally, Part IV concludes
that because of the peculiar political dynamics of initiative and
referendum, which diminish normal safeguards of minority inter-
ests, courts may appropriately apply heightened due process and
equal protection standards when reviewing direct legislation.
1. Ti FmmAST No. 10 (J. Madison).




II. THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM PROCESSES
A. Procedural Overview
Initiative may be defined as the process in which legislation
proposed by a specified number of voters is submitted to the electo-
rate for approval. Referendum is the process of submitting for voter
approval matters proposed or already passed upon by a legislative
body. These methods of direct legislation, while of ancient origin,'
did not enjoy popularity in the United States until the end of the
nineteenth century.' Direct legislation was initially argued to be
derogative of the federal constitution's guarantee of a "republican
form of government." 6 The first statewide initiative and referen-
dum procedures were adopted by South Dakota in 1898 and by 1924
eighteen states had adopted some form of statewide initiative or
referendum.7 Many of those states expressly extend the initiative
and referendum powers to municipalities. Direct legislative meth-
ods are also available at the local level in some states that have not
adopted statewide procedures.8
The procedures governing initiative and referendum may be
established in a state's constitution, statutes, or local charters. Al-
though specifics vary considerably from state to state' and between
the state and local level, some typical procedures are identifiable.
Both initiative and referendum are characteristically commenced
by circulation of a petitiono setting forth the matter to be consid-
4. Democracy by plebiscite was practiced in the Greek city-states. See Munro,
Introduction, in THE INrTIATIvE, REFERENDUM, AND REcALL 4 (W. Munro ed. 1920).
5. See generally R. LucE, LEGISLATIVE PRiNCIPLEs 572 (1930). Direct legislation was
conceived as a check on representative government.
The Progressive movement of the early twentieth century was disdainful of legislatures
and legislators. [Reformers] considered them purchaseable, greedy, and dominated by
political bosses and ruthless machines which sought to exploit the public for the benefit
of the monopolists, railroads, and industrial empires. With legislative channels blocked
and public officials deaf to the demands of the voters, the ills of democracy could only
be cured by more democrary-by letting the people legislate directly rather than indi-
rectly.
G. MrrAu, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: POIMCS AND PROCESSES 90 (1966).
6. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4. In Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118
(1912), the Supreme Court considered a challenge to initiative and referendum under the
representative form of government clause and held that the issue presented a nonjusticiable
political question. See notes 37-40 infra and accompanying text.
7. TiME, Oct. 30, 1978, at 34.
8. See Note, Initiative and Referendum-Do They Encourage or Impair Better State
Government?, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 925, 936-37 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Initiative and
Referendum].
9. For a detailed description of state procedures, see THE CouNcIL OF STATE GovERN-
mENTs, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 225-28, 243-45 (1978-79) and Initiative and Referendum,
supra note 8, at 928-29.
10. In some states, a designated government agency must approve a formal application
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ered by the electorate." The petition must then be signed by a
specified number of voters'2 and filed with the appropriate govern-
ment agency to qualify for placement on the ballot. In most state-
wide initiative and referendum procedures a simple majority is re-
quired for passage.
Initiative procedures are of two basic types: direct and indirect.
In the indirect initiative, the proposed measure is submitted to the
legislature which may pass the measure into law, propose alterna-
tive measures to be included on the ballot, or refrain from any
action.' In the direct initiative, the legislature plays ho intermedi-
ary role and properly proposed measures are placed directly on the
ballot. 5 Constitutional or statutory grants of initiative power com-
monly exclude appropriation measures and court procedural mat-
ters from the scope of the power."
Referendum procedures are also of two basic types. In states
employing the first type, filing a referendum petition" suspends any
prior legislative action until the referred matter is considered by the
electorate." In those states utilizing the second type, legislative acts
remain in effect unless rejected by the electorate." As with initia-
tive, appropriation measures are often excluded from the referen-
dum power. 20 In addition, "emergency measures" relating to the
immediate preservation of the public health and safety are fre-
quently exempted from referendum. 21
before a petition may be circulated. Such applications typically contain the text of the
proposed measure and the signatures of a relatively small number of voters. See Initiative
and Referendum, supra note 8, at 927-28.
11. In some states the legislature may refer legislation to the electorate without a voter
petition. See Initiative and Referendum, supra note 8, at 928-29.
12. The requisite number is often expressed as a percentage of the voters in the last
general election. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 8(b), 9(b). Some states also require a certain
geographic distribution among the residences of those signing the petition. See, e.g., ALASKA
CONsT. art. XI, § 3.
13. See, e.g., OR. CONsT. art. IV, § 1(4)(d). Furthermore, in some states, a specified
minimum number of persons must vote on the proposed measure. See, e.g., WYo. CONsT. art.
III, § 52(f).
14. See, e.g., ALAsKA CoNsT. art. XI, § 4.
15. See, e.g., CAL.. CONsT. art. II, § 9. Direct initiative measures must typically be filed
at least four months prior to the next general election. In some states provision is made for
the calling of a special election to consider the proposed matter. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. amend.
7, § 1.
16. See, e.g., ALAsKA CONsT. art. XI, § 7.
17. All states require that the petition be filed within a specified period, typically either
90 days after the legislature passes the measure, e.g., CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 9(b), or before
the adjournment of the current session of the legislature. E.g., WYo. CoNsT. art. III,
§ 52(e).
18. See, e.g., CoLO. CoNsT. art. V, § 1.
19. See, e.g., NEV. CONST. art. XIX, § 1(2).
20. See, e.g., MONT. CoNsT. art. m, § 5.
21. See, e.g., On. CoNsr. art. IV, § 1(3)(a).
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The action of the electorate through initiative or referendum is
typically not subject to the veto power of the executive. 22 Some
states also restrict the power of the legislature to amend or repeal
initiative or referendum statutes."
B. Contrasts: Direct versus Representative Legislation
The above overview of initiative and referendum processes sug-
gests several contrasts to the more familiar representative model of
legislation. First, the electorate as a whole cannot function as a
deliberative body in the same manner as a limited number of repre-
sentatives. Moreover, the public at large does not have the same
opportunity to develop expertise on legislative matters as do their
representatives. These limitations have led to the criticism that the
electorate is often unable to adequately understand the full signifi-
cance of proposed legislation and therefore may be incapable of
formulating a rational "public will." 24
Second, differences in the mechanics and psychology of voting
exist between direct and representative legislative processes. In the
representative model, voting does not purport to always reflect pop-
ular opinion. Central to the representative model is the principle
that legislators are free to vote according to their own perception of
the long range best interest of the polity. 5 In the direct legislation
model, however, voting theoretically mirrors the true consensus of
popular opinion. The accuracy of this assumption has been ques-
tioned by critics of initiative and referendum who argue that the
high abstention rate characteristic of direct legislative voting26 per-
mits lawmaking by relatively small special interest groups.2
A third significant difference is that initiative and referendum
statutes are typically not subject to the executive veto power.2 A
further difference may exist in states that restrict the legislature's
ability to repeal or amend direct legislation. 29 In contrast, the execu-
tive veto and the authority of the legislature to reverse itself serve,
22. See, e.g., AIUZ. CoNsr. art. VI, pt. 1, § 1(6).
23. The extent of these restrictions vary considerably from state to state. For a sum-
mary of the subject see Initiative and Referendum, supra note 8, at 935-36.
24. See Campbell, The Initiative and Referendum, 10 MICH. L. REV. 427, 428 (1912).
25. See generally, E. BumE, WoRKs 89, 96 (7th ed. 1881); J. MiL., CoNSIDERMrONS ON
REPRESENTAnVE GovERMEr (1875).
26. See Schmacber, Thirty Years of People's Rule in Oregon: An Analysis, 47 PoL. ScI.Q. 242, 245 (1932).
27. Holman, The Unfavorable Results of Direct Legislation in Oregon, in THE INrrFA-
TIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL, supra note 4, at 283.
28. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
29. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
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in the representative model, to check legislative excesses and mis-
takes.
A fourth and related difference between the two models exists
in the relative absence of separation of powers concerns in the direct
legislation model. The electorate at large is not a coordinate branch
of the government that the judiciary and executive branches must
treat deferentially to prevent institutional conflicts and preserve the
separation of powers balance. 0
The remainder of this Note is largely devoted to examining the
federal constitutional significance of these distinctions between the
direct and representative legislation models. The standards for test-
ing the constitutionality of legislative acts have developed chiefly in
the context of the representative legislation model. The issue ad-
dressed in the following analysis is whether those standards should
be modified in the direct legislation context.
Il1. CONSTrrIUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS'ON INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
A. Introduction: The Guaranty Clause
The controversy over direct versus representative lawmaking is
an ancient polemic. Rousseau asserted, "[e]very law which the
people in person have not ratified is invalid; it is not a law.""' Some
of the founders, however, viewed the pure democracy advocated by
Rousseau as a dangerous impetus to factionalism and majoritarian
oppression.32 In The Federalist" Madison argued that the evil of
faction could be best checked by a republican form of government.
A republic he defined as "a government in which the scheme of
representation takes place."u In Madison's view, representation
would serve:
to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium
of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest
of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely
to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.?
Given this philosophical background," it is not surprising that
when initiative and referendum began to gain popularity in the
30. See generally, L. TRiBE, AMERIcAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw 15-19 (1978).
31. RoussEAu, CONTRAT SocIAL, c. XV (1762).




36. See Rice v. Foster, 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 479, 487 (1847). The court observed that repre-
sentative government serves to guard against "rashness, precipitancy, and misguided zeal;
and to protect the minority against the injustice of the majority."
1979] 1147
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early 1900's, critics of the movement seized upon the guaranty
clause in Article IV, section 437 of the Constitution as a basis for
challenging the direct legislative method. In Pacific States Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 8 the Supreme Court considered
a guaranty clause challenge to a tax statute enacted pursuant to a
provision of the Oregon constitution reserving the power of initiative
and referendum to the people. Appellant argued in the classic Madi-
sonian tradition that it had been denied a republican form of gov-
ernment by the direct legislative process." The Court, however,
refused to consider the issue, labeling it a "political question" com-
mitted exclusively to Congress. 0 The Court's refusal to entertain a
direct constitutional challenge to the direct legislative method rele-
gates any attack to the more generalized constraints of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. Substantive Due Process Constraints
As early as Calder v. Bull"1 in 1798, the Supreme Court recog-
nized constitutional limits on governmental power to invade indi-
vidual autonomy. Later, these limitations were expressly embodied
in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which has
been interpreted as imposing substantive as well as procedural limi-
tations on governmental power." This substantive prong guarantees
freedom from arbitrary governmental action, requiring that legisla-
tion be in pursuit of a legitimate end and that the means employed
bear some relation to that end. With the demise of the "era of
substantive due process"4 3 in the 1930's, the Court abandoned its
strict scrutiny of both legislative means and ends and adopted in-
stead an extremely deferential standard of review. Under this stan-
dard the Court upheld legislation if it was able to hypothesize a
37. Article IV reads, in part: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government. . . ." U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4.
38. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
39. Id. at 124.
40. Id. at 151. An interesting question remains whether Congress could enact legislation
forbidding the use of initiative and referendum by the states and their political sub-units.
41. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). Calder invalidated a Connecticut law which had the
effect of reversing a probate court's disposition of property under a will. Justice Chase de-
clared that the government was without authority to enact a law that "takes property from
A. and gives it to B." Id. at 388.
42. This development occurred early in the post-civil war period with such cases as
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885), and found its broadest expression in the era of
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating maximum-hour legislation for bakers).
For a detailed discussion of these developments, see L. TRME, supra note 30, at 427-34.
43. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1933) (upholding minimum wage
legislation). See generally, L. TRmE, supra note 30, at 450-55.
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legitimate legislative purpose and any conceivable connection be-
tween that hypothetical end and the chosen means." Eventually the
Court evolved a second tier of substantive due process analysis that
requires a strict level of scrutiny to both means and ends when the
legislation infringes upon so-called fundamental rights."
The Court has consistently attributed its use of the deferential
"rational basis test" in socio-economic matters to concern over the
lack of judicial competence to evaluate legislative choices among
conflicting social values." The adequacy of this explanation is
drawn into question, however, by the Court's willingfiess to engage
in precisely such interest-balancing when fundamental rights are at
issue." The apparent judicial abdication under the rational basis
test can perhaps more accurately be explained in either of two ways.
First, the Court can be described as having adopted a pluralistic
philosophy of lawmaking with regard to socio-economic matters.
Under pluralist dogma "no public interest exists beyond the log-
rolling result of the legislative process."" Accordingly, judicial scru-
tiny of legislative ends is meaningless because any end chosen
through proper political processes is by definition permissible. In a
pluralistic scheme, judicial review of legislative means is equally
hollow. Means scrutiny is conceived to test the rationality of the
legislatively perceived relationship between ends and means; but
when any end is appropriate, any means is also justified, because
every means must in logic effectuate some permissible end." Such
a pluralist approach reduces the rational basis test to no test at all.
The second explanation for the Court's policy of selective defer-
ence is that legislative judgments in socio-economic affairs have
been sustained because political processes have characteristically
produced results that are substantively acceptable to the Court.
This explanation allows for continued scrutiny of legislative ends to
ensure that legislation pursues a public good beyond "the shifting
summation of private interests through the political process."I" This
44. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
45. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
46. See Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); L. TRmE, supra note 30, at 451-53.
47. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973).
48. L. TRmE, supra note 30, at 451.
49. In the analogous equal protection context, Professor Gerald Gunther has advocated
the application of heightened means scrutiny as a meaningful constraint on lawmaking, while
rejecting review of legislative ends. The logical difficulty in maintaining that means may be
scrutinized without engaging in a concomitant review of the ends has been pointed out in
Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 208 (1976).
50. L. TRIBE, supra note 30, at 451. Tribe advocates the explicit adoption of the latter
approach by the Court.
1979] 1149
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explanation would account for the Court's description of legislative
ends in terms of the general public interest when hypothesizing the
purpose of a challenged statute.5 ' This explanation is also more
compatible with the Court's willing application of ends scrutiny in
cases involving fundamental rights.
The current judicial policy of highly deferential scrutiny of
socioeconomic legislation has been developed almost exclusively in
the review of the acts of representative legislatures. The Court has
never expressly spoken on whether that same deferential standard
of review is appropriate in the direct legislation context. If one at-
tributes judicial deference to the adoption of a pluralist philosophy,
then scrutiny must be as toothless in the direct legislative model as
it is in the representative model. If, however, one believes that judi-
cial deference is attributable to the Court's substantive satisfaction
with legislative results, then several considerations suggest that a
heightened level of scrutiny might be appropriate in the review of
direct legislation.
One of the great dangers of direct democracy perceived by Mad-
ison was its propensity to reflect solely the majoritarian self-interest
rather than some broader concept of the "public good."5 2 This po-
tential for majoritarian oppression of the minority is exacerbated by
characteristically high abstention rates on direct legislation bal-
lots."3 This voting pattern makes possible lawmaking by special in-
terest bodies that do not command the support of even a majority
of the electorate. The Supreme Court has demonstrated sensitivity
to such voting power dynamics in the equal protection context. In
equal protection analysis, the level of scrutiny is significantly raised
when the Court determines that the legislation in question particu-
larly affects the politically disadvantaged. 4 While not deciding the
issue in his opinion, Justice Stone articulated this political process
theme in his famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products
Co. :"
[L]egislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, [may] be subjected
to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Four-
teenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.
. . .[S]imilar considerations [may] enter into the review of statutes
51. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (sustaining a statute
forbidding the entrance of new businesses into the French Quarter as a means to preserve
the "tourist-oriented charm" and hence the economy of the city).
52. See notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text.
53. See Initiative and Referendum, supra note 8, at 941.




directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities: prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry."
The same concerns for majoritarian oppression expressed by
Justice Stone are also relevant in the due process context. Just as
legislation that promotes the self-interest of the majority or plural-
ity at the expense of the minority may violate equal protection," it
also may constitute a denial of due process in that the end pursued
is not the general public good. The convergence of equal protection
and due process principles was pointed out by the Court in Bolling
v. Sharpe:5 # "[T]he concepts of equal protection and due process,
both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mu-
tually exclusive. . . . [D]iscrimination may be so unjustifiable as
to be violative of due process."5 1 Because the direct legislative
method tends "to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities""o it arguably falls
within the spirit of Justice Stone's footnote. The extent to which
bypassing "the medium of a chosen body"" of representatives di-
minishes ordinary political safeguards may not be so great as to
warrant the strict scrutiny suggested by Justice Stone, but the loss
of those safeguards may still justify a more searching level of review
than is typically applied in "rational basis" scrutiny.62
A second consideration that might lead a court to more care-
fully review the substance of initiative statutes is recognition of the
limitations that exist on the public's ability to adequately evaluate
the impact of complex legislation. Such a paternalistic approach
may be inappropriate in the representative legislation context be-
56. Id. (citations omitted).
57. See text accompanying notes 127-151 infra.
58. 347 U.S. 497 (1954)(holding racial segregation in public schools violative of Fifth
Amendment due process).
59. Id. at 499.
60. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
61. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
62. Perhaps some precedent for such a heightened level of review exists in a line of
zoning cases in which state courts have carefully scrutinized local zoning regulations that
have an impact beyond the boundaries of the enacting jurisdiction, e.g., exclusionary zoning
prohibiting low income housing, thereby putting increased pressure on surrounding communi-
ties. The political impotence of neighboring communities seems to be the justification for the
more exacting scrutiny applied by the courts. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP
v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975);
Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138,
appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). For a discussion of the case law in this area, see
Wolfstone, The Case for a Procedural Due Process Limitation on the Zoning Referendum:
City of Eastlake Revisited, 7 EcoLOGY L.Q. 51, 70-76 (1978).
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cause legislators have the opportunity to educate themselves on
proposed matters during hearings and debate. In the direct legisla-
tion context, however, greater judicial scrutiny may serve to assure
that the electorate acts in its own best interest."
The argument for heightened scrutiny based upon either im-
pairment of political safeguards or a paternalistic perspective of the
electorate is strengthened by the special status sometimes granted
to initiative and referendum statutes under state law. For example,
direct legislation is typically exempt from the executive veto and
may also enjoy limited immunity from repeal or preemption by the
representative legislature." Justice Stone's renowned footnote"
again supplies support for a higher standard of review:
"[1]egislation which restricts those political processes which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about the repeal of undesirable legis-
lation, [may] be subject to more exacting scrutiny."" Thus, since
direct legislation often has a more permanent effect than represent-
ative legislation, the former should be subject to a "more exacting"
standard.
A more demanding standard of review is also justified by the
relative absence of separation of powers concerns in the direct legis-
lation context. 7 Free from fears of treading on the institutional toes
of a coordinate branch, the judiciary can more actively assert its
perception of the public good, at least to the limits permitted by
judicial competence.
Admittedly, a heightened standard of substantive due process
scrutiny entails that certain degree of the social value-judging that
characterized the Lochner era. Nevertheless, as has been suggested
above, the same value judgments are routinely employed in funda-
mental rights cases and, indeed, have never really been wholly
abandoned in socio-economic matters." Lower courts, however, may
be reluctant to venture into a role that could be perceived as
63. Analogy can usefully be made to the protectionist role courts play pursuant to state
law in carefully reviewing ballot titles and other literature distributed to voters regarding a
proposed initiative or referendum matter. If the court finds this material deceptive or mis-
leading it may order the ballot reformed, strike the measure from the ballot, or even overturn
the results of a vote already held. This subject is discussed in greater detail in the text
accompanying notes 69-126 infra, discussing procedural due process.
64. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.
65. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4. (1938).
66. Id.
67. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
68. See L. TamE, supra note 30, at 454-55. Tribe suggests that our constitutional system
inevitably places the judiciary in the position of making substantive judgments and argues
that courts should openly acknowledge that responsibility rather than operating behind the
facade of selective deference.
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"Lochneresque" without some signal from the Supreme Court.
Given such reluctance, constraints on direct legislation may more
practically be achieved through the procedural prong of the due
process clause.
C. Procedural Due Process Constraints
Procedural due process in its most familiar application compels
governmental adherence to specified substantive standards in the
enforcement of legislative dictates. In this context, due process re-
quires that persons against whom a particular law is to be enforced
receive notice and an opportunity to be heard." A less familiar
application of procedural due process is in the lawmaking as op-
posed to the law-enfording context."o The substantive standards
with which a lawmaking body must comply are generally prescribed
by a higher legislative authority or are self-imposed. These stan-
dards typically include the number of members necessary to consti-
tute a quorum or the number of votes required for enactment. In
addition to these express requirements, principles of due process
may impose a minimal level of fundamental fairness or lawmaking
procedures. Alluding to this concept of a fundamental fairness floor
in due process of lawmaking, the Supreme Court observed at an
early date that due process "is a restraint on the legislative as well
as on the executive and judicial powers of the government, and
cannot be so construed as to leave congress [or the states] free to
make any process 'due process of law,' by its mere will.""
The primary purpose of due process in lawmaking is to provide
governmental regularity. 2 Regularity serves to promote two desired
goals. First, regularity encourages rationality. Requiring lawmakers
to observe certain procedural standards increases the likelihood that
the factors that in logic and fairness should affect the decisionmak-
ing process are actually taken into consideration.73 The second value
promoted by regularity is the element of justice that derives from
proceeding in a similar manner in similar situations.
Although it is clear in theory that procedural due process ap-
69. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
70. For a detailed discussion of procedural due process in lawmaking, see Linde, Due
Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 30, at 1141
& n.7.
71. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276
(1856).
72. See L. TIBE, supra note 30, at 456.
73. In this manner, procedural rules encourage more desirable substantive outcomes.
As the Court observed in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), "The history of
liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards." Id. at 347.
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plies to lawmaking,7' what "process" is due has not been the subject
of frequent Supreme Court consideration. The limited case law does
demonstrate that legislators are not required to employ a rational
decisionmaking process to arrive at their substantive result. They
need not consider all or even any of the relevant facts, nor are they
required to analyze those facts they do consider in any accurate or
logical fashion. This striking truth is made abundantly clear from
cases like Townsend v. Yeomans."6 In Townsend, tobacco ware-
housemen challenged a Georgia rate-fixing statute on the grounds
that the state legislature made no effort to ascertain information
relevant to the legislation. The Court rejected the attack, stating
simply that "the legislature . . . is presumed to know the needs of
the people of the State. Whether or not special inquiries should be
made is a matter for the legislative discretion."7
The Court's refusal to police the decisionmaking processes of
legislatures can be attributed, in part, to a reluctance to intrude
upon a coordinate branch. This reluctance is so pronounced that
even when it appears likely that due process has been violated, the
Court will refuse to scrutinize the challenged procedure. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Ballin,7 the Supreme Court assumed that
the validity of a statute was dependent upon the presence of a
quorum and the requisite number of votes78 but refused to question
the accuracy of the speaker's count of the quorum. Fletcher v. Peck"
is illustrative of the same judicial reluctance. Although it appears
clear that due process is violated if a legislative enactment is pro-
cured by bribery, when confronted with a clear case of corruption
in lawmaking, the Court in Fletcher refused to set aside the tainted
statute. Commenting on the unavailability of judicial review in such
a case, Justice Marshall observed:
If the principle be conceded, that an act of the supreme sovereign power might
be declared null by a court, in consequence of the means which procured it,
still would there be much difficulty in saying to what extent those means must
be applied to produce this effect. Must it be direct corruption? or would inter-
est or undue influence of any kind be sufficient? Must the vitiating cause
operate on a majority? or on what number of the members? Would the act be
null, whatever might be the wish of the the nation? or would its obligation or
nullity depend upon the public sentiment? If the majority of the legislature
74. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
75. 301 U.S. 441 (1937).
76. Id. at 451.
77. 144 U.S. 1 (1892).
78. For an example of a circumstance in which the Court did insist upon compliance
with procedural rules, see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (holding that proper
procedures were not employed in refusing to seat Representative Adam Clayton Powell).
79. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
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be corrupted, it may well be doubted, whether it be within the province of
judiciary to control their conduct, and, if less than a majority act from impure
motives, the principle by which judicial interference would be regulated, it is
not clearly discerned."
In summary, procedural due process in lawmaking does not require
legislators to employ rational decisionmaking processes, and al-
though in theory it may prohibit deviation from fixed procedural
rules and basic notions of fairness, the courts are very reluctant to
probe the inner-workings of a coordinate branch."' Consequently,
tainted statutes are permitted to remain in effect." The low level
of "process" required in lawmaking and the highly deferential stan-
dard of review employed by the courts have been articulated largely
in the context of challenges to the acts of representative legislatures.
Courts that have considered whether the same standards should be
applied to direct legislation have reached conflicting results.
The cases in which challenges to the direct legislation process
arise usually concern local zoning regulation. To understand the
case law in this area, it is first necessary to understand the structure
of decisionmaking in local land use planning. In the municipal con-
text the decisionmaking authority is typically exercised by a zoning
board" or a city council acting on the board's recommendation. The
zoning board as an administrative agency acts sometimes in a quasi-
legislative capacity and sometimes in a quasi-adjudicative capacity.
When the board serves in an adjudicative role, it must observe the
same due process standards required in any other administrative
enforcement proceeding." However, when the board acts in a legis-
lative role, the aforementioned due process standards for lawmaking
apply," together with any additional procedures required by state
law.88
80. Id. at 130.
81. See, e.g., City of Miami Beach v. Schauer, 104 So. 2d 129 (Fla. Ct. App. 1958), cert.
discharged, 112 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1959); Coffin v. City of Lee's Summit, 357 S.W.2d 211 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1962).
82. See Linde, supra note 49, at 244-51. Professor Linde is careful to distinguish be-
tween a violation of due process and the availability of a remedy for that violation through
judicial review.
83. See ADvisoRY CoMM. ON ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZON-
ING ENABLING Acr (rev. ed. 1926), reprinted in J. MrZENBAUM, THE LAw OF ZONING 303-07
(1930).
84. See, e.g., Londoner v. County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (requiring that notice
and an oral hearing be afforded landowners contesting the city's valuation of their property).
85. See text accompanying notes 74-82 supra. See, e.g., Bi-Metalic Investment Co. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (state-wide change in method of calculating
property tax held not to require prior hearing).
86. State law frequently imposes certain notice and hearing requirements on the zoning
board even when it is acting in a quasi-legislative capacity.
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It is clear that subjecting a quasi-adjudicative matter to initia-
tive or referendum would constitute a denial of due process because
the requisite notice and hearing would be lacking."7 In comparison,
quasi-legislative matters could be subject to initiative and referen-
dum. Some courts, however, have placed an additional limitation
on the use of direct legislation in the quasi-legislative context, hold-
ing that certain matters, although not adjudicative, are
"administrative" in character and therefore not subject to initiative
or referendum."8 In sharp contrast, other courts have insisted that
all non-adjudicative matters are subject to initiative and referen-
dum, regardless of the procedural limitations imposed by state law
on zoning boards when acting on identical matters."
The question whether the direct legislation method affords due
process in lawniaking was confronted directly by the Supreme Court
in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc."o In Eastlake a
real estate developer challenged the constitutionality of a city
charter amendment providing for mandatory referendum on all zon-
ing changes. The developer had applied to the local planning com-
mission for reclassification of his property to permit construction of
a multi-family, high-rise apartment building. The planning com-
mission recommended the proposed change and the city council
accepted their recommendation. When the council's decision was
referred to the electorate, however, it was defeated. The developer
87. See Londoner v. County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).:
88. See, e.g., Kelly v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713 (1956) (city ordinance rezon-
ing ten contiguous parcels from residential to commercial held administrative in character
and therefore not subject to referendum); Ruano v. Spellman, 81 Wash. 2d 820, 505 P.2d 447
(1973) (court ordered removal from the municipal ballot of an initiative measure cancelling
construction of a stadium labeling the matter "administrative").
The exemption of "administrative" matters from initiative and referendum is usually
based on state law although some courts have indicated that federal due process might require
the same result. See, e.g., Taschner v. City Council, 31 Cal. App. 3d 48, 107 Cal. Rptr. 214
(1973) (holding that enactment of building height limitation by initiative violated 14th
Amendment due process); People's Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. App. 3d 869,
106 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1973) (proposed initiative ordinance concerned with environmental mat-
ters would violate 14th Amendment due process). In Associate Home Builders, Inc. v. City
of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976), the California Supreme
Court expressly disapproved of the language in Taschner and People's Lobby which prohib-
ited the use of initiative and referendum in all zoning matters. 18 Cal. 3d at 596 n.14, 557
P.2d at 480, n.14, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 48, n.14. The court, however, was careful to preserve the
legislative-administrative dichotomy, stating that direct legislation was not available when
"the state's system of regulation over a matter of statewide concern is so pervasive as to
convert the local legislative body into an administrative agent of the state." Id. (citations
omitted).
89. See San Diego Building Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d
570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974) (holding that the 14th Amendment did not prohibit enactment
of building height restriction ordinance by initiative).
90. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
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brought suit challenging the referendum procedure as a denial of
due process. The Ohio Supreme Court" upheld the challenge hold-
ing that a popular referendum, "lacking standards to guide the
decision of the voters, permitted the police power to be exercised in
a standardless, hence arbitrary and capricious manner." 2 The Ohio
court characterized the constitutional deficiency as an "unlawful
delegation of legislative .power" to the people. 3
In a 6-3 decision the United States Supreme Court reversed.
The Court initially dismissed the contention that the referendum
procedure was an unlawful delegation of legislative power, observing
that because direct legislative power was reserved to the people by
the Ohio constitution," there was no issue of delegation. 5
The Court next considered the true gravamen of the constitu-
tional challenge-whether the referendum procedure deprived the
land developer of due process in lawmaking. The Court initially
observed that under Ohio law the proposed zoning change was clas-
sified as a "legislative" rather than an "administrative" matter.
Having accepted that classification, the Court had no need to con-
sider the body of case law dealing with due process in quasi-
adjudicative decisionmaking." The Court rejected the contention
that the referendum procedure constituted a denial of due process,
stating that the direct legislative method is "both a practical and
symbolic part of our democratic processes."" Thb Court gave little
weight to the Ohio Supreme Court's observation that, "[uinder
Eastlake's procedure, . . . no mechanism existed, nor indeed could
exist, to assure that the voters would act rationally in passing upon
a proposed zoning change."" In a footnote the Court indicated that
there is no enforceable guarantee of rationality in the process of
lawmaking, whether it be direct or representative." The Court
stated: "[E]xcept as a legislative history informs an analysis of
legislative action, there is no more advance assurance that a legisla-
tive body will act by conscientiously applying consistent standards
91. 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E.2d 740 (1975).
92. 426 U.S. at 672.
93. Id.
94. OmIo CONST., art. II, § 1(f).
95. 426 U.S. at 675.
96. See, e.g., Londoner v. County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). Justice Powell's one
paragraph dissent in Eastlake indicated dissatisfaction with the Court's acceptance of Ohio's
"legislative" label. Powell apparently regarded the proposed zoning change as a quasi-
adjudicative matter requiring the panoply of procedural safeguards associated with that form
of decisionmaking.
97. 426 U.S. at 673.
98. Id. at 675.
99. Id. at 675-76 n.10.
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than there is with respect to voters."'" In the same footnote the
Court remarked that petitioner's constitutional relief, if any, lay in
challenging the product of the lawmaking process if it failed to meet
substantive due process standards.10' The Court concluded that
"[a]s a basic instrument of democratic government, the referen-
dum process does not, in itself, violate the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment when applied to a rezoning ordi-
nance." 102
Justice Stevens filed a lengthy dissent to the majority opinion
in Eastlake.'10 For Justice Stevens, the "legislative" label on the
zoning change decision did not alter its quasi-adjudicative charac-
ter. Justice Stevens distinguished questions of broad community
policy, for which he conceded that a referendum was appropriate,
from matters narrowly involving the interests of particular persons
in particular property. Justice Stevens concluded that, because the
referendum procedure did not provide the property owner with "a
fair opportunity to have his claim determined on its merits," it
violated due process."0'
The disagreement between the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Eastlake was facially whether the proper characterization for
the decisionmaking process was legislative or adjudicative. Beneath
that disagreement, however, may lie a more subtle difference of
opinion over the appropriate role of initiative and referendum in
republican government."s Certainly the majority's praise of direct
legislation as "a classic demonstration of 'devotion to democ-
racy' "'" demonstrates a basic trust for that method of lawmaking
that is not evident in Justice Stevens' opinion. The level of the
majority's trust in initiative and referendum is further demon-
strated by their unwillingness to distinguish between the require-
ments of procedural due process in the direct and representative
legislation contexts.107 Apparently, for the majority, rationality in
the decisionmaking process is not required, or at least is judicially
unenforceable, in either setting.0 s
Resort once again to some fundamental distinctions between
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 679.
103. Id. at 680. Justice Stevens was joined in his dissenting opinion by Justice Brennan.
104. Id. at 693-94.
105. See Wolfstone, supra note 62, at 94-95 (citing Williams & Doughty, Studies in
Legal Realism: Mount Laurel, Belle Terre and Berman, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 73 (1976)).
106. 426 U.S. at 679 (quoting James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971)).
107. See text accompanying notes 97-100 supra.
108. See text accompanying notes 74-76 supra.
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the direct and representative legislation methods suggests that dif-
ferent procedural due process standards should be applied to direct
and representative legislation. In Bi-Metalic Investment Co. v.
State Board of Equalization,o'0 Justice Holmes, writing for a unani-
mous Court, held that due process did not require the state to afford
notice and a hearing to taxpayers before increasing the valuation of
all taxable property in Denver. Explaining the requirements of due
process in this context, Justice Holmes stated:
Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impractica-
ble that every one should have a direct voice in its adoption. The Constitution
does not require all public acts to be done in town meeting or an assembly of
the whole. General statutes within the state power are passed that affect the
person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without
giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are protected in the only way
that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote,
over those who make the rule."*
Holmes clearly delineated the dynamics of the political process as
the procedural safeguard of individual rights. But, the political dy-
namics of the direct and representative legislation models are not
the same."' If the processes of initiative and referendum afford less
protection against the selfish pursuit of majoritarian self-interest,
then Justice Holmes' statement arguably supports the proposition
that a higher level of procedural safeguards may be required in
direct legislation.
Justice Marshall's opinion in Fletcher v. Peck"2 expressed two
basic concerns that inhibited judicial review of legislative pro-
cesses."' The first was that the judiciary lacked standards by which
to evaluate the validity or invalidity of a particular legislative pro-
cess. The same concern for lack of standards may be raised with
respect to the feasibility of requiring additional procedural safe-
guards in the direct legislation context. A potential answer to this
concern is to require that the level of procedure increase in propor-
tion to the risk of majoritarian political oppression. To illustrate this
analysis, governmental decisionmaking may be visualized as a spec-
trum. At one extreme are those legislative decisions in which the
risk of majoritarian oppression inheres to a relatively low degree. As
one moves along the spectrum toward the opposite pole the risk of
unfairness produced by majoritarian oppression increases. Accord-
ingly, under such an approach the need for procedural protection
109. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
110. Id. at 445.
111. See text accompanying notes 24-30 supra.
112. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
113. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
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would increase as the size of the electorate decreased."' A further
increase would be necessary as the number of persons adversely
affected by the legislation decreased. At some point the need for
procedural safeguards would become so great that the availability
of initiative and referendum as the lawmaking method would be
ruled out. Continuing along the spectrum one eventually reaches
the point at which decisions become so particularized that they are
classified as adjudicative and may no longer be resolved by legisla-
tive processes in any form.
The decisions of the Supreme Court in Eubank v. City of
Richmond" and Washington v. Roberge"I may lend indirect sup-
port to the above suggested approach. In Eubank "the Court invali-
dated a city ordinance which conferred the power to establish build-
ing setback lines upon the owners of two-thirds of the property
abutting any street."' In Roberge "the Court struck down an ordi-
nance which permitted the establishment of philanthropic homes
for the aged in residential areas, but only upon the written consent
of the owners of two-thirds of the property within 400 feet of the
proposed facility.""' The Eastlake Court distinguished Eubank and
Roberge on the basis that in those cases legislative power had been
exercised by "a narrow segment of the community" rather than by
"the people at large."" Eubank and Roberge arguably evidence a
concern for the likelihood of political oppression that inheres when
legislative power is vested in a group of self-interested individuals.
It is this same concern that would dictate the inappropriateness of
initiative and referendum in some decisionmaking settings.
The above suggested analysis is subject to the criticism that it
requires arbitrary line-drawing to delineate the point on the deci-
sionmaking spectrum at which direct legislation becomes an inap-
114. Madison observed that the propensity for majoritarian oppression decreases as the
size of the polity increases:
If an enlargement of the sphere is found to lessen the insecurity of private rights, it is
not because the impulse of a common interest or passion is less predominant in this case
with the majority; but because a common interest or passion is less apt to be felt and
the requisite combinations less easy to be formed by a greater than by a smaller number.
The Society becomes broken into a greater variety of interests, of pursuits of passions,
which check each other, whilst those who may feel a common sentiment have less
opportunity of communication and concert.
Madison, Views of the Political System of the United States, in FREE GOVERNMENT IN THE
MAKING 172 (A. Mason ed. 1949).
115. 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
116. 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
117. 426 U.S. at 677 (describing the Eubank holding).




propriate process. But the line drawing that would be required
under such an approach is not unlike that presently engaged in to
differentiate legislative from quasi-adjudicative matters. Indeed,
many of the same factors would be considered. At a minimum,
distinguishing between representative and direct lawmaking may
provide a principled explanation for the practice in some jurisdic-
tions of labeling certain nonadjudicative matters as
"administrative"I 20 in order to exempt them from initiative and
referendum.12 1 It is these "administrative" decisions that fall be-
tween the point on the spectrum at which direct legislation becomes
inappropriate and the point by which legislative process in any form
must end.
Justice Marshall's opinion in Fletcher v. Peck'2 also expressed
concern about the propriety of probing the decisionmaking pro-
cesses of a coordinate branch of government.m As this Note has
suggested, separation of powers problems, at least in the form of
institutional conflict, are much reduced in the direct legislation
model. It may be argued then, that in reviewing initiative and refer-
endum statutes the judiciary may appropriately look behind the
substantive result to the process from which it derived.
This more active judicial role is not without precedent. Under
state statutory principles the courts presently review many aspects
of direct legislative procedures to assure that they are not "unfair
or deceptive.""12  Courts have even invalidated direct legislation
when they found some aspect of the enacting process to be mislead-
ing to the electorate.ss For example, in Anne Arundel County v.
McDonough, 2 the Maryland Court of Appeals declared a referen-
dum void because the ballot statement was so misleading that it
prevented an exercise of intelligent choice by the voters. The intru-
120. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
121. See Wolfstone, supra note 62 (proposing a unitary standard that would merge the
administrative and adjudicative classifications).
122. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
123. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
124. See, e.g., Markus v. Trumbull County Board of Elections, 22 Ohio St. 2d 197, 259
N.E.2d 501 (1970) (declaring a referendum ballot "null and void" because the description of
the ballot question was "insufficient, ambiguous and misleading"); Oregonians for Nuclear
Safeguards v. Myers, 276 Or. 167, 554 P.2d 172 (1976) (ordering certain misleading and unfair
passages deleted from the voters' pamphlet).
125. See, e.g., Anne Arundel County v. McDonough, 277 Md. 271, 354 A.2d 788 (1976)
(declaring a referendum void because ballot statement found to be misleading); Troland v.
City of Malden, 332 Mass. 351, 125 N.E.2d 134 (1955). Cf. Turner v. Barnhart, 83 N.M. 759,
497 P.2d 970 (1972) (ballot found not sufficiently misleading to set aside referendum). See
also Comment, Avoidance of an Election or Referendum When the Electorate Has Been
Misled, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1077 (1957).
126. 277 Md. 271, 354 A.2d 788 (1976).
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siveness of judicial review required to assure constitutional due pro-
cess standards would be no greater than presently necessary to en-
force state law procedural requirements.
The above suggested analytical approach is based on the propo-
sition that notions of fundamental fairness embodied in the due
process clause restrict the processes that government may prescribe
for legislative decisionmaking. Admittedly, the dearth of relevant
Supreme Court cases makes support for this proposition largely
theoretical. In the search to give content to the generality of the due
process clause, courts should not overlook the policies that lie be-
hind the guaranty clause. When those concerns are considered, it is
both reasonable and constitutionally defensible to differentiate be-
tween those decisions that are properly subject to direct legislation
and those that should be subject only to representative legislation.
D. Equal Protection Constraints
The equal protection clause has as its goal the assurance of
even-handedness in governmental action.'27 Specifically, the equal
protection doctrine requires that the government have sufficient
justification for establishing legislative and administrative classifi-
cations. As in substantive due process analysis, the courts have
developed a two-tiered model for determining the adequacy of the
proferred justification for unequal treatment. For socioeconomic
regulation, the governmentally drawn classification must be a ra-
tional means to effectuate a legitimate legislative end.12' Classifica-
tions that distinguish between persons on the basis of suspect char-
acteristics like race or that cause unequal treatment with regard to
"fundamental rights" must be justified by a compelling governmen-
tal interest."' Under this "strict scrutiny" test, the means-end rela-
tionship also must be particularly close, allowing for very little over-
or under-inclusiveness in the classification.
In this Note's discussion of substantive due process, it was sug-
gested that because of the propensity for majoritarian oppression
inherent in the direct legislative method, a heightened level of judi-
127. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 30, at 991-1002.
128. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). Judicial scrutiny of both
the rationality of the means and the legitimacy of the end has often been very deferential,
with the court hypothesizing the character of the ends so as to assure the "fit" of the means.
See, e.g., Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (holding that
promoting the "morale and esprit de corps" of harbor pilots "might" have been the legislative
purpose). A high tolerance of underinclusiveness or overinclusiveness in the governmental
classification is allowed. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).




cial review might be appropriate. Majoritarian oppression is argua-
bly objectionable under the due process clause because it results in
the pursuit of improper legislative ends.3 0 The same evil may be
addressed through the equal protection clause. Indeed, the equal
protection doctrine is specifically calculated to protect political
minorities. Accordingly, the lack of political safeguards for minority
interests arguably warrants heightened judicial scrutiny of classifi-
cations drawn by direct legislation. In addition to challenges to the
substance of initiative and referendum statutes, the equal protec-
tion clause may also be employed to attack a system of lawmaking
that requires specified decisions to be made only by direct legisla-
tion. On several occasions the Supreme Court has considered
whether subjecting some legislative matters but not others to man-
datory referendum constitutes a denial of equal protection. In
Hunter v. Erickson,'"' the Court considered the constitutionality of
a municipal regulation which provided that any ordinance relating
to racial discrimination was ineffective until accepted by a majority
of the electorate in referendum.'3 2 The Court found that the regula-
tion contained an explicit racial classification and therefore was
subject to "most rigid scrutiny."rs" Unpersuaded by the proferred
justification of permitting greater popular participation in decisions
relating to race relations,'"3 the Court struck down the ordinance.',,
A similar challenge to a mandatory referendum system reached
the Court in James v. Valtierra.'3 In James, plaintiffs challenged
an article of the California constitution which provided that "no
low-rent housing project should be developed, constructed, or ac-
quired in any manner by a state public body until the project was
130. See text accompanying notes 48-51 supra.
131. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
132. The text of the challenged ordinance was as follows:
"Any ordinance enacted by the Council of The City of Akron which regulates the
use, sale, advertisement, transfer, listing assignment, lease, sublease or financing of real
property of any kind or of any interest therein on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin or ancestry must first be approved by a majority of the electors voting
on the question at a regular or general election before said ordinance shall be effective.
Any such ordinance in effect at the time of the adoption of this section shall cease to be
effective until approved by the electors as provided herein." Akron City Charter § 137.
393 U.S. at 387 (quoting the Akron ordinance).
133. 393 U.S. at 391-92.
134. Id. at 392. The Court observed that the people of Akron already possessed the
referendum power prior to the enactment of the challenged ordinance. The effect of that
ordinance was to selectively increase the difficulty of enacting fair housing regulations by
delaying their effectiveness until approved by referendum and by specifying that such refer-
endum could be held only at a general rather than a special election. Id. at 392 n.7.
135. Id. at 393.
136. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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approved by a majority of those voting at a community election.""
The Court found that the challenged constitutional provision did
not contain a racial classification and therefore was not required to
withstand strict scrutiny."' The provision easily passed muster
under a less demanding standard of review as a reasonable means
to assure citizens a voice on questions of public policy.'
Commentators have observed that the facially race-neutral
classification in James may mask a racially discriminatory pur-
pose.'" Although such an illicit intent might be inferred from a
showing that the governmental classification had a racially dispro-
portionate impact, the Supreme Court has recently indicated that
more direct proof of improper motive is required. In Village of Ar-
lington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., "I the
Court declared that "[proof of racially discriminatory intent or
purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause."" 2 The Court added that disproportionate impact is insuffi-
cient, in itself, to prove illicit motive."' Other evidence of intent, the
Court observed, might be found in the "specific sequence of events
leading up to the challenged decision""' or in the "legislative or
administrative history.""' The Court also mentioned "departures
from the normal procedural sequence"' of decisionmaking as evi-
dence of improper motive. Although the Court's discussion of possi-
ble methods of proving discriminatory intent appears to invite prob-
ing of legislative decisionmaking processes, the Court, citing
Fletcher v. Peck,"' cautioned against inappropriate "intrusion into
the workings of other branches of government."" 8
If the proof of intent standards announced in Arlington Heights
are applied equally to direct and representative lawmaking the
problems of proof in the initiative and referendum context will be
formidable."' Again the distinctions between the direct and repre-
137. Id. at 139.
138. Id. at 141.
139. Justice Marshall dissented on the grounds that strict scrutiny should be applied
to classification on the basis of poverty. Id. at 143-45.
140. See Comment, The Application of the Equal Protection Clause to Referendum-
Made Law: James v. Valtierra, 1972 U. I.. L.F. 408.
141. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
142. Id. at 265.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 267.
145. Id. at 268.
146. Id. at 267.
147. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra.
148. 429 U.S. at 268 n.18.
149. At least one court has noted the extreme difficulty in proving actual discriminatory
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sentative lawmaking models discussed in Part II suggest that differ-
ing standards of proof might be appropriate. It is initially apparent
that in the direct legislation context no legislative or administrative
history will be available to a reviewing court-a circumstance that
will further exacerbate problems of proof. It is also significant that
the political dynamics of initiative and referendum are particularly
prone to reflect the highly emotional, majoritarian self-interest com-
monly associated with racial discrimination. Additionally, insofar
as it represents a departure "from the normal procedural sequence"
of decisionmaking, use of direct legislation may indicate discrimina-
tory intent.5 0 Finally, in the direct legislation model, courts need
not be inhibited in their motive scrutiny by the separation of powers
concerns articulated in Arlington Heights."' The sum of these fac-
tors may justify the application of a less rigorous standard of proof
in cases of alleged racial discrimination through a system of manda-
tory initiative or referendum.
IV. CONcLusIoN
This Note's analysis of due process and equal protection con-
straints upon initiative and referendum may be distilled to a central
thesis-because political safeguards of minority rights are dimin-
ished in the direct legislative model of lawmaking, courts may ap-
propriately apply a heightened level of substantive and procedural
review to assure that constitutionally guaranteed recognition of
those interests is not ignored. The tenability of that thesis is predi-
cated upon several assumptions. The substantive due process argu-
ments presuppose that the "public good" represents a compromise
of the panoply of individual and group self-interests in society 52 and
not simply "the shifting summation of private interests through the
political process."'"5 In the procedural due process context, it is
necessary to assume the existence of a fundamental fairness floor to
the processes that a society may employ in lawmaking."'
The validity of this thesis is ultimately predicated upon the
premise that within the generalized constraints of due process and
equal protection there exists a principled basis for distinguishing
intent in direct legislation. See Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of
Union City, 424 F.2d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1970).
150. In Arlington Heights the Court cited departures from established routines as indi-
cia of such intent. See 429 U.S. at 267.
151. Id. at 268 n.18. See text accompanying notes 147-48 supra.
152. See text accompanying notes 48-51 supra.
153. L. TRME, supra note 30, at 451.
154. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
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representative from direct lawmaking. In an effort to give content
to the due process and equal protection clauses, the Court has cus-
tomarily looked to other, more specific provisions of the Constitu-
tion. In this instance, the long-neglected guaranty clause can pro-
vide the principle that gives the content.
In Madison's view a legislative body of representatives pos-
sessed a special competence to perceive and pursue the long-range
public interest in a way not possible for popular democracy.'" When
the Court refused to consider a guaranty challenge to the direct
legislative method as a nonjusticiable political issue, it avoided the
fundamental question of whether the Constitution incorporates a
preference for representative lawmaking. That unanswered question
must still be addressed in judicial application of the due process and
equal protection clauses. Before answering in the negative it would
be well to consider the wisdom of the framers.
DAVID JAMEs JORDAN
155. See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
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